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Abstract- This study examines the possible effects of dividend policy on firm value. The study covers 10 quoted companies 
studied for the period of 1995-2015. In so doing, the methodology adopted is the ordinary least square regression analysis 
for primary data analyses and multiple regression analysis for the secondary data analyses with models MPS (Market Price 
Per Share) as dependent variable, EPS (Earnings Per Share) and DPS (Dividend Per Share) as independent variables. The 
co-efficient of determination is R
2
 to evaluate the data collected from the ten studied companies and the Nigerian stock 
exchange. The study shows the relevance of dividend, dividend as a signaling model and proves that firm value is greatly 
influenced by dividend policy as far as public limited companies are concerned.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Dividend policy has been an issue of interest in financial 
literature since joint stock companies came into existence. 
According to John and Williams (2000)[13], “dividend 
policy connotes to the payout policy, which managers 
pursue in deciding the size and pattern of cash distribution 
to shareholders overtime”. Management‟s primary goal is 
shareholder‟s wealth maximization, which translates into 
maximization of the value of the company as measured by 
price of the company‟s common stock. The area of 
corporate dividend policy has attracted attention of 
management scholars and economists culminating into 
theoretical modeling and empirical examination. Thus, 
dividend policy is one of the most complex aspects in 
finance (kapoor  2009)[14]. The optimal dividend policy 
is the one that maximizes the company stock price that 
leads to the maximization of firm value.   
Dividend are sticky because firms are typically reluctant 
to change dividend, in particular, firms avoid cutting 
dividends even when earnings drop. Dividend decisions 
are recognized as centrally important because of 
increasingly significant role of the finances in the firm‟s 
overall growth strategy. The objective of the finance 
manager should be to find out the optimal dividend policy 
that will enhance value of the firm (Gordon 2003). Nippel 
(2008), argues that the share prices of a firm tend to be 
reduced whenever there is a reduction in the dividend 
payments. Announcement of dividend increases generate 
abnormal negative security returns. A drop in share prices 
occurs because dividends have a signaling effect. 
According to the signaling effect, managers have private 
and superior information about future prospects and 
choose a dividend level to signal that private information. 
This may lead to a stable dividend payout ratio. 
Since Modigliani and miller initiated modern corporate 
finance theory Modigliani and Miller (1958)[16] and 
Miller and Modigliani (1961)[18], a lot of researches have 
been made to explain market responses to dividend 
announcement by the firms.  
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961)[18], the effect 
of a firm‟s dividend Policy on the value of the firm is a 
matter of considerable importance, not only to 
management who must set the policy, but also to investors 
planning portfolios. This poses the question, to what 
extent, if any, does dividend policy impact on firm‟s 
value. Lease et al (2000) posits that there are two distinct 
and opposing theories on dividend policy and its effect on 
firm value, namely, the irrelevant dividend theory and the 
relevant dividend theory. The dividend policy controversy 
as sparked by these two opposing dividend theories has 
contributed hugely to the ongoing dividend debate as to 
whether dividend policy affects share price and firm 
value. According to Lease et al (2000) there are managers 
and even a higher percentage of academics that question 
the value added of a carefully chosen dividend policy. 
Some go as far as to suggest that dividend policy is 
irrelevant; that one policy is as good as any other and that 
dividend payments should only be made on a residual 
basis. Others hold the view that a managed dividend 
policy can positively influence firm value. This poses the 
question, to what extent, if any, does dividend policy 
impact on firm value This study will analyse how 
dividend policies affect firm value, particularly in public 
companies in Nigeria. 
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The general purpose of this study is to examine and 
analyse, through an empirical study dividend policy and 
the effect, if any, they have on the value of the firm. The 
specific objective of this study will be; 
1. To empirically examine the determinants of dividend 
payout by firms and find out its linkage with 
information content of dividends. 
2. To analyse the influence of agency cost and on 
dividend payment pattern.  
3. To analyse the effect of dividend policies on firm 
value of public companies in Nigeria.  
The following hypothesis will be tested: H1: information 
content of dividends determines dividend payout by 
firms.H2: agency cost between shareholders and 
management affects the dividend payment pattern of 
firms. 
H3: there is an effect of various dividend policies on 
shareholders wealth. 
This study will focus on the effect of dividend policy on 
firm value. Public companies in Nigeria will be studied in 
the course of this work. This study will cover; 
1. First bank Nigeria plc for the period of  1995-2015 
2. Nigerian Breweries plc for the period of 1995-2015 
3. presco plc for the period of 1995-2015 
4. Julius Berger plc for the period of 1995-20015 
5. Cadbury Nigeria plc for the period of 1995-2015 
6. Oando plc for the period of 1995-2015 
7. Guiness Nigeria plc for the period of 1995-2015 
8. Dangote Cement Nigeria plc for the period of 1995-
2015 
9. May and Baker Nigeria Plc for the period of 1995-
2015 
10. Royal exchange Assurance Nigeria plc for the period 
of 1995-2015. This is to ensure that all sector of 
Nigerian economy is represented. 
2. DIVIDEND POLICY 
Pandy (2005) defines dividend as that portion of a 
company‟s net earnings which the directors recommend 
to be distributed to the shareholders in proportion to their 
shareholdings in the company. It is usually as a 
percentage of nominal value of the company‟s ordinary 
share capital at a fixed amount per share. 
Dividends are usually paid out of the current year‟s profit 
and sometimes out of general reserves. They are normally 
paid out in cash, and this form of dividend payment is 
known as cash dividend. Another option available to a 
company for the distribution of earnings is by stock 
dividend (bonus issue) which is supplementary to cash 
dividend when cash is paid to the shareholders, it has an 
adverse effect on the liquidity position and the reserves of 
the firm as it tends to reduce both of the (cash and 
reserves). Unlike cash dividend, stock dividend does not 
affect the total net worth of the firm, as it is a 
capitalization of owner‟s equity portion. 
2.1 Types of dividend policy 
Dividend distributions to stakeholders may be in the form 
of: 
2.1.1 Cash dividends 
These are the most common and usually paid quarterly or 
biannually. 
2.1.2 Stock dividends  
These are payments to existing shareholders in the form 
of stock as a replacement for or a supplement to cash 
dividends. This method reduces the value per share even 
though the company‟s assets, profits and total value are 
unaffected. 
2.1.3 Stock splits 
Similar to a stock dividend and is commonly used to 
lower the market price of a firm‟s stock by increasing the 
number of shares belonging to each shareholder. This is 
also known as the dividend valuation model.  
2.1.4 Share repurchases 
Company repurchases from its shareholders outstanding 
shares in the marketplace. The desired effects are to 
enhance shareholder value and discourage hostile 
takeovers. 
2.1.5 Constant-payout –ratio  
Based on the payment of a certain percentage of earnings 
to owners every dividend period. 
2.1.6 Regular dividend policy  
Payment of a fixed amount of dividend in each period 
2.1.7 Low-regular-and-extra dividend policy 
payment of a low regular dividend supplemented by 
further dividends when earnings are sufficient. 
2.1.8 Low Regular and Extra Policy 
This is similar to the nominal payment in that a set 
amount is paid every dividend period. But extra cash can 
be paid out at irregular times of the year if more money 
was earned than usual. The extra payment is called an 
extra dividend because it is unexpected. 
2.2 Dividend policy models with information 
asymmetries 
Management, because of the position they hold in the 
organization, usually possess confidential information 
about the organisation whether current knowledge or 
future prospects. Because of this superior knowledge in 
relation to other stakeholders, information asymmetry 
exists. According to Lease (2000), dividend policy is used 
by managers to communicate their superior information to 
the market. Management therefore uses dividend policy as 
a communication mechanism. M and M (1961)[18] 
asserts that under perfect capital markets, information is 
costless and that all individuals are symmetrically 
informed and therefore, the firm‟s dividend policy 
conveys no new information which is already known to 
the markets. This is in line with M and M‟s irrelevant 
dividend theory that states that the value of the firm is 
independent of its dividend policy. In the real world, 
however, where market imperfections exist, the 
irrelevance of dividend policy to a firm‟s value seems to 
be inconsistent with the empirical evidence of dividends, 
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according to Lease et al (2000) and Baker et al (2002)[4]. 
Lease et al (2000) continues by stating that a multitude of 
empirical research have documented the significant 
impact that dividend announcements have on shareholders 
wealth. The research shows that dividend increases are 
greeted with share price increases and the opposite is true 
with dividend decreases. Empirical research, according to 
Lease et al (2000) has provided formal arguments, in the 
form of dividend signaling models, analyzing whether 
dividends payments are a credible medium for providing 
information to the markets. 
2.3 Dividend policy and agency problem 
In modern corporations, agency problems arise from the 
conflicts between corporate insiders and corporate 
outsiders. In widely held firms, characterized by a highly 
dispersed ownership structure, the firms‟ managers are the 
only corporate insiders, and the firms‟ shareholders can 
be defined as the corporate outsiders. In controlled firms, 
i.e. firms that are not widely held, the controlling 
shareholders are 
the firms‟ corporate insiders together with the managers 
under their control. In contrast, the firms‟ minority 
shareholders can be defined as the corporate outsiders.  
Agency problem underpins the relationship between the 
principal and the agent. Within the context of the firm, 
agency theory is primarily concerned with owner- 
manager relationship and with need for shareholders to 
monitor management behavior. This need arises due to 
the separation of ownership and control and the associated 
conflicts of interests that arise between shareholders 
(principal) and managers (agents). (Manos, 2001).it is 
based on this idea that monitoring of the firm and its 
management is helpful in reducing agency conflicts and in 
convincing the market that the manager are not in a 
position to abuse their position. Some shareholders may 
be monitoring managers, but the problem of collective 
action results in too little monitoring taking place. Thus 
Easterbrook (2000) suggests that one way of solving this 
problem is by increasing the payout ratio. When the firm 
increases its dividend payment, assuming it wishes to 
proceed with planned investment, it is forced to go to the 
capital market to raise additional finance. This induces 
monitoring by potential investment of the firm and its 
management, thus, reducing agency problem. 
Van Horne et al (2001) develop a model that underpins 
this theory, called the cost minimization model. This 
model combines the transaction costs that may be 
controlled by limiting the payout, with the agency costs 
that may be controlled by limiting the payout, with the 
agency cost that may be controlled by raising the payment 
ratio. The central idea on which the model rests is that the 
optimal payment ratio is at the level where the sum of 
these two types of costs is minimized. 
The agency approach moves away from the assumptions 
of the Modigliani and Miller‟s theory by recognizing two 
points. First, the investment policy of the firm cannot be 
taken as independent of its dividend policy and in 
particular, paying out dividends may reduce the efficiency 
of marginal investments. Second, and more subtly, the 
allocation of all the profits of the firm to shareholders on 
a pro-rata-basis cannot be taken for granted, and in 
particular the insider may get preferential treatment 
through assets diversion, transfer prices and theft, even 
holding the investment policy constant. In so far as 
dividend is paid on a pro-rata-basis, they benefit outside 
shareholders relative to alternative of expropriable 
retained earnings.(Kapoor, 2009)[14]Lease et al (2000) 
states that other stakeholders do not hold significant 
influence in the firm and because of this disparity in 
influence, an agency relationship exists. Baker et al 
(2002) states that, in their attempt to answer the dividend 
puzzle, firms pay dividends because they wish to reduce 
the agency cost among various stakeholders, especially 
the agency costs between shareholders and management. 
The two most important agency relationships that exist 
with regard to the payment of dividends are the agency 
relationships between:  
• shareholders and debenture holders, and  
• shareholders and management.  
2.4 Theoritical framework  
Among numerous conjectural and empirical studies 
regarding impact of dividend over firm value the 
pioneering work by Modigliani and Miller (1958)[16] and 
Miller and Modigliani (1961)[18] where the authors 
proved persuasively the irrelevance of dividend policy to 
firm value within a perfect capital market without the 
presence of tax. Even as they established the theoretical 
foundations for dividend irrelevance, Miller and 
Modigliani (1966)[17] realized that dividends and 
dividend changes indirectly convey a considerable 
amount of information at least about management's 
expectations of long-run future profits. This earnings 
information itself is an integral part to the firm's 
underlying operations and hence would affect firm value. 
2.5 Residual theory of dividend policy 
The essence of the residual theory of dividend policy is 
that the firm will only pay dividends from residual 
earnings, that is, from earnings left over after all suitable 
(positive NPV) investment opportunities have been 
financed. Retained earnings are the most important source 
for financing for most companies (Baker et al 2002)[4]. A 
residual approach to the dividend policy, as the first claim 
on retained earnings will be the financing of the 
investment projects. With the residual dividend policy, 
the primary focus of the firm‟s management is indeed on 
investment, not dividends. Dividend policy becomes 
irrelevant, it is treated as a passive rather than an active, 
decision variables. According to Baker et al (2002)[4], the 
view of management in this case is that the value of firm 
and the wealth of its shareholders will be maximized by 
investing the earnings in the appropriate investment 
projects, rather than paying them out as dividends to 
shareholders. Thus managers will actively seek out, and 
invest the firm‟s earnings in, all acceptable (in terms of 
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risk and return) investment projects, which are expected 
to increase the value of the firm. Dividends will only be 
paid when retained earnings exceed the funds required to 
finance the suitable investment projects. Conversely when 
the total investment funds required exceed retained 
earnings, no dividend will be paid. 
2.6 Motive for a residual policy 
The motives for a residual policy, or high retentions, 
dividend policy commonly include: 
1. A high retention policy reduces the need to raise 
fresh capital, (debt or equity), thus saving on 
associated issues and floatation costs. 
2. A fresh equity issue may dilute existing ownership 
control. This may be avoided, if retentions are 
consistently high. 
3. A high retention policy may enable a company to 
finance a more rapid and higher rate of growth. 
When the effective rate of tax on dividend income is 
higher than the tax on capital gains, some shareholders, 
because of their personal tax positions, may prefer a high 
retention/low payout policy. (Baker et al 2002)[4] 
2.7 Dividend irrelevance theory 
The dividend irrelevance theory by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961)[18] is based on the premise that a firms dividend 
policy is independent of the value of the share price and 
that the dividend decision is a passive residual. They are 
of the view that the value of the firm is determined by its 
investment and financing decision within an optimal 
capital structure, and not by its dividend decision. A 
common dividend policy should be able to serve all firms 
because the dividend policy is irrelevant in determining 
firm value. 
The residual concept of dividends is based on the decision 
of dividing surplus earnings between future investments 
and the payment of dividends. Thus, a firm can either 
retain all of its surplus earnings for investment in future 
positive NPV projects or distribute dividends from the 
residue of the surplus earnings after providing for positive 
NPV investments, the firm is not obliged to pay 
dividends. In this manner, dividends are seen as a passive 
residual and are irrelevant in affecting firm‟s value. 
Alternatively, shareholders are indifferent as to whether 
they receive the expected return on their investment in the 
form of dividends or in the form of an appreciation of 
share value. 
The basic premise of their argument is that firm value is 
determined by choosing optimal investments. The net 
payout is the difference between earnings and 
investments, and simply a residual. Because the net 
payout comprises dividends and share repurchases, a firm 
can adjust its dividends to any level with an offsetting 
change in share outstanding. From the perspective of 
investors, dividend policy is irrelevant, because any 
desired stream of payments can be replicated by 
appropriate purchases and sales of equity. Thus, investors 
will not pay a premium for any particular dividend policy. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) [18]concluded that given 
firms optimal investment policy, the firm‟s choice of 
dividend policy has no impact on shareholders wealth. In 
other words, all dividend policies are equivalent. The 
most important insight of miller and Modigliani‟s analysis 
is that it identifies the situation in which dividend policy 
can affect the firm value. It could matter not because 
dividends are “safer” than capital gains, as was 
traditionally argued, but because one of the assumptions 
underlying the result is violated. The propositions rest on 
the following four assumptions; 
1. Information is costless and available to everyone 
equally. 
2. No distorting taxes exist 
3. Flotation and transportation costs are non existent 
4. None contracting or agency cost exists. 
 According to cima (2002), Miller and Modigliani 
developed their theory in a perfect capital market setting. 
The basic assumptions underlying this theory are; 
1. In a perfect capital market, no buyer, seller or issuer 
of securities is large enough for their transactions to 
significantly affect the current ruling price. 
2. That information regarding the ruling price is 
available to all without cost, and no brokerage fees, 
transfer taxes or other transaction costs are incurred 
in the trading of securities. 
3. That no tax differentials exist between dividends and 
capital gains. 
4. That all investors will behave rationally in that they 
will prefer more wealth to less, and they are 
indifferent as to whether any given increment of their 
wealth is in the form of cash payments or an increase 
in the market value of their holdings. 
5. That perfect certainty carries the implication of 
complete assurance on the part of every investor as to 
the future investment programme and future profits 
of every company. 
 M & M argue that the sum of the present value per share 
after the payment of dividends equal the current value per 
share before the dividend payments. Stated differently, 
the prevailing market price of the share at the beginning 
of a period can be defined as the present value of the 
dividend which is paid during the period, plus the present 
value of the market price of the share at the end of the 
period, (Baker et al 2007).Investors are therefore 
indifferent towards retained earnings and the payment of 
dividends (with concurrent new issue financing) in all 
future periods. Thus, shareholders‟ wealth is not 
influenced by current and future dividend decisions, but 
depends entirely on the earning power of the firms assets 
(Uddin and Chowdhury, 2005). 
According to Lease et al (2000) intuitively, the dividends 
irrelevance policy can be explained as follows; if an 
investor desires to receive from a firm cashflows that 
exceed the dividend payment chosen by the firm‟s 
management, the investor can create homemade dividends 
by selling shares to achieve the desired cashflow level. 
This reduction in the shareholders ownership stake in the 
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firm from the sale of shares exactly matches the decline in 
share value the investor would experience if the firm paid 
the desired dividend or the investor would create a 
homemade dividend via selling shares, the investor is 
equally satisfied and the investors remaining shares have 
the same value. 
Lease et al (2004) posits that if the investor receives 
dividend cashflow that exceed his or her consumption 
needs, then investor can still neutralize the firm‟s 
dividend decision by reversing the flow of unwanted 
shares. With this transaction, the value of the shareholders 
interest remains unchanged although the shareholder had 
forgone a dividend payment from the firms‟ standpoint, if 
the dividend payment under the desired dividend policy 
exceeds the operating cashflows less positive NPV 
investment expenditures, the firm makes up the financing 
shortfall by selling new shares in the market place. Under 
perfect capital market selling shares is costless, so 
whether the firm finances new investments from 
internally or externally generated funds, is immaterial. 
Hence, from both the investor‟s and the firm‟s 
perspectives, a managed dividend policy is no different 
from a residual policy. 
According to Uddin and Chowdhury (2005), M & M 
abandon the assumption of complete certainty in regard to 
future profits and investments, and consider the case of 
uncertainty. They admit that dividends and share price are 
subject to uncertainty, but maintain that dividend policy 
still continues to be irrelevant, and base their conclusion 
upon the arbitrage argument. The operation of arbitraging 
is taking advantage of market aberrations which present 
opportunity for profitable two- way simultaneous 
transactions in equivalents, that is, operations in which 
one share is bought and its equivalent sold at about the 
same time. This market inbalances in the short term, gives 
rise to opportunities for profit taking until an equilibrium 
point is reached. The assumption is that every investor 
behaves rationally in preferring more wealth to less. In 
these circumstances, differences in current and future 
dividend policies will not affect the market price of the 
two firms- the reason being that the present value of the 
future dividends, plus the market prices of the share at the 
end of the period is the same. In these circumstances, 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) maintain that, even under 
uncertainty, dividend policy is irrelevant and does not 
affect the share price of the firm given the investment 
policy of the firm. And as such does not affect 
shareholders wealth.  
In summary, the dividend irrelevance theory according to 
Uddin and Chowdury (2005) states that the logic of the 
irrelevance theory is not disputed given the assumptions 
underlying the model. However, it is now generally 
accepted that the value of a model lies in the predictive or 
explanatory power and that the model cannot be judged 
by reference to the realism of its underlying assumptions. 
2.8 Relevance of dividend 
On the evolution of dividend distributions, DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo(2006) [7]observed that dividend payment 
patterns of firms are a cultural phenomenon, influence by 
custom, beliefs, regulations, public opinion, perceptions 
and hysteria, general economic conditions and several 
other factors, all in perpetual change, 
impacting different firms differently. They posits that if 
dividends are irrelevant as proposed by M & M, then the 
dividend enigma deepens as companies could have 
retained earnings, the cheapest form of financing, to 
invest in profitable future NPV investments. 
Lease et al (2000) opines that the dividend relevance 
theory relaxes the assumption of perfect capital markets 
and rational investors. It analyses, empirically the 
behavior patterns of dividend distributions and their 
effects on the value of the firm. In the real world, market 
frictions are not costless and at most, investors do not 
always act rationally. 
Baker et al (2002) defines dividend policy under the 
relevance theory as follows; the dividend policy is a 
practical approach which treats dividends as an active 
decision variable and retained earnings as the residual 
dividends are more than just a means of distributing net 
profit, and that any variation in dividend payout ratio 
could affect shareholders wealth, a firm should therefore, 
endeavour to establish an optimal policy that will 
maximize shareholders wealth. 
Litner and Gordon ( in Gitman 2003), pioneers of 
dividend relevance theory argues that shareholders prefer 
dividends to capital gains. Gitman continues, fundamental 
to this proposition is their bird-in-hand argument, which 
suggest that investors are generally risk averse and attach 
less risk to current as opposed to future dividends or 
capital gains, current dividend payments are therefore, 
believed to reduce investors uncertainty, causing investors 
to discount the firms earnings at a lower rate, thereby, all 
things being equal, placing a higher value on the firm. 
2.9 Dividend signaling theory 
In practice, change in a firm‟s dividend policy can be 
observed to have an effect on its share price – an increase 
in dividend producing an increasing in share price and 
then shareholders wealth and a reduction in dividends 
producing a decrease in share price and then shareholders 
wealth. This pattern led many observers to conclude, 
contrary to M&M‟s model, that shareholders do indeed 
prefer dividends to future capital gains. Needless to say 
M&M disagreed. (Asan, 2009) 
The change in dividend payment is to be interpreted as a 
signal to shareholders and investors about the future 
earnings prospects of the firm. Generally a rise in 
dividend payment is viewed as a positive signal, 
conveying positive information about a firm‟s future 
earning prospects resulting in an increase in share price. 
Conversely a reduction in dividend payment is viewed as 
negative signal about future earnings prospects, resulting 
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in a decrease in share price and wealth of investors. 
(Asan, 2009). 
 Baker et al (2002) states that the signaling models for 
paying dividends, developed by Bhattacharya , John and 
Williams (2000)[13], and Miller and Rock (1985) suggest 
that managers as insiders choose dividend payment levels 
and increases, to signal private information to investors. 
According to them, managers have an incentive to signal 
this private information to the investment public when 
they believe that the current market value of their firm‟s 
shares is below its intrinsic level. The increased dividend 
payment serves as a credible signal when other firms that 
do not have favorable inside information cannot copy the 
dividend increase without unduly increasing the chance of 
later incurring a drop in dividends. The theorists therefore 
conclude that the dividend signaling hypothesis confirms 
that increased (decreased) cash dividends should 
experience positive (negative) price reactions. Dividend 
announcements signaling future profitability have also 
been established through empirical research conducted by 
Aharony and Dotan (1994), Bernheim and Wantz (1995), 
Brooks, Charlton and Hendershott (1998) and others, as 
noted in Baker, et al (2002). Most share price changes 
took place immediately following the announcement of a 
dividend, especially positive or negative dividend 
changes, through findings of empirical studies conducted 
by Aharony and Swary (1990), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983), and Kalay and Lowenstein (1996) as noted in 
Baker et al (2002). However, consistency in findings in 
respect of dividend signaling models, have not been 
achieved over the years. Studies conducted by De Angelo, 
De Angelo and Skinner (2004) did not support the 
hypothesized relation between dividend policies and 
future earnings.  According to Frankfurter et al (2002), 
advocates of the signaling theories believe that corporate 
dividend policy is a cheaper medium of conveying private 
information to the markets than any other media forms. 
Frankfurter et al (2002)[8] states that the use of dividends 
as signals imply that alternative methods of signalling are 
not perfect substitutes.  
2.10 Bird-in-the-hand theory 
According to Kapoor ( 2009)[14], the essence of the bird-
in-the-hand theory of dividend policy (advanced by John 
Litner in 1962 and Myron Gordon in 1963) is that 
shareholders are risk-averse and prefer to receive 
dividend payments rather than future capital gains. 
Shareholders consider dividend payments to be more 
certain than future capital gains – thus a “bird in the hand 
is worth more than two in the bush”. 
Gordon 2003 contended that the payment of current 
dividends “resolves investor uncertainty”. Investors have 
a preference for a certain level of income now rather than 
the prospect of a higher, but less certain, income at some 
time in the future. 
The key implication, as argued by Litner and Gordon, is 
that because of the less risky nature dividends, 
shareholders and investors will discount the firm‟s 
dividend stream at a lower rate of return, “r”, thus 
increasing the value of the firm‟s shares. 
According to the constant growth dividend valuation (or 
Gordon‟s growth) model, the value of an ordinary share, 
SV0 is given by: 
SV0 = D1/(r-g) 
Where the constant dividend growth rate is denoted by g, 
r is the investor‟s required rate of return, and D1, 
represents the next dividend payments. Thus the lower r is 
in relation to the value of the dividend payment D1, the 
greater the share‟s value. In the investor‟s view, according 
to Linter and Gordon, r, the return from the dividend, is 
less risky than the future growth rate g. 
M&M argued against this and referred to it as the bird-in-
the-hand fallacy. In their irrelevancy model, M&M 
assume that the required rate of return or cost or capital, r, 
is independent of dividend policy. They maintain that a 
firm‟s risk (which influences the investor‟s required rate 
of return, r) is a function of its investment and financing 
decisions, not its dividend policy. 
M&M contend that investors are indifferent between 
dividends and capital gains – that is, they are indifferent 
between r and g is the dividend valuation model. The 
reason for this indifference, according to M&M, is that 
shareholders simply reinvest their dividends in share of 
the same or similar risk companies. 
2.11 Empirical study of dividend in Nigeria 
The earliest major attempt to explain dividend behavior of 
companies has been credited to Lintner (1956)[15] who 
conducted this study on American company in 1950s. 
Since then there has been an on going debate on dividend 
policy in the developed market resulting in mixed, 
controversial and inclusive results. 
This issue did not receive any serious attention among 
academic scholars in Nigeria until 1974. Uzoaga and 
Alozieuwa (1974) (in Adelegan 2003) attempted to 
highlight the pattern of dividend policy pursued by 
Nigerian firms, particularly during the period of 
indigenization and participation programme defined in the 
first indiginazation Decree of 1973 their study covered 52 
company- years of dividend action (13 companies for four 
years). They reported that they found very minimum 
evidences to support the classical influences that 
determine dividend policies in Nigeria during this period. 
They concluded that fear and resentment seem to have 
taken over from the classical forces. 
However, Inang (1978) and Soyode (1975) 
[25]commented on the work of Uzoaga and Alozieuwa. 
Inang (1998) concluded that the problem arising from 
dividend policy can be attributed to the share pricing 
policy of the capital issue commission (CIC), which seem 
to have ignored the classical factors that should have 
govern the pricing of equity share issues. This in turn 
made companies to abandon all the classical determinants 
of dividend policy. Soyede criticized Uzoaga and 
Alozieuwa‟s work on the ground that it glossed over some 
important determinants of optimal dividend policy; he 
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also questioned certain conclusions made in the study 
because they were inadequate or a mistaken evaluation. 
Furthermore, Oyejide (1976) empirically tested for 
company dividend policy in Nigeria using Lintner‟s 
model as modified by Brittian (1964), He disagreed with 
previous studies and reported that the variable evidence 
strongly support the fact that conventional devices explain 
the dividend policy of Nigerian public companies. Odife 
(1977) criticized the Oyejide study for failing to adjust to 
stock dividends and seem to agree with Uzoaga and 
Alozieuwa‟s conclusion. However, Izedonmi and Eriki 
(1996) using data from 1984-1989 found supporting 
evidence in Nigeria for Lintner‟s model. 
Adelegun (2003) evaluated the asymmetric information of 
dividend, given earnings by shareholders in Nigeria. She 
carried out a study on 882 firms by analyzing the dividend 
policy and its effect on wealth maximization on a sample 
of 62 quoted firms in Nigeria over a wider testing period 
of 1887-2000. She found a 
significant result and concluded that dividend policy does 
affect wealth maximization.  
With the exeption of Izedonmi and Eriki (1996)[12] and 
Adelegun (2003)[1], the inconclusive controversy seems 
to have come to a temporary halt in the late 1990s. The 
attention of academic scholars became diverted in the 
early 1990s to the study of the weak- form efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH) on the Nigerian stock market. 
Few other scholars have tried to continue the research on 
dividend policy but without a new finding like Emenuga 
(2004), Olowe (1998)[23] and Oludoye (1999). 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The structural framework of this study is based on Survey 
design and ex-post facto research design.Questionnaires 
were administered to the respondents from First bank 
Nigeria plc, Nigerian Breweries plc, Presco plc, Julius 
Berger plc, Cadbury Nigeria plc, Oando plc, Guiness 
Nigeria plc, Dangote Cement Nigeria plc, May & Baker 
Nigeria Plc, Royal exchange Assurance. To ensure that all 
industries quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange are 
covered, these companies were selected. 
The ex-post factor design type will also be used in this 
research work to analyse secondary data because there is 
no experiment involved, but rather is designed to test an 
event that has already taken place. Therefore, it deals with 
historical facts about dividend policy and its effect on 
firm value. 
Primary and Secondary data will be used in this work. 
The research instrument used to obtain primary data is the 
structured questionnaire. The data machinery adopted for 
secondary data will be the published annual reports of 
selected firms for the relevant years sampled for analysis 
.The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) bulletin and the 
closing price of share for each company, for the relevant 
years sampled for analysis. 
The population of this research will be the 180 public 
limited companies in Nigeria as at September 2015, with 
a selection of 10 companies using the Quota random 
sampling technique. This is applied where the population 
is made up of some natural grouping or parts. Each 
natural grouping is given a fair representation in the 
sample (Asika 2006). The basis is to ensure that all 
industries are covered. . The respondents of these firms 
are their finance managers, chief accountants, chartered 
accountants who act as agents, stock brokers, directors 
and shareholders. A total number of 120 questionnaires 
was distributed and the researcher was unable to distribute 
20 copies. The research instrument contains 13 questions 
on dividend policies against which the respondents were 
asked to indicate their level of agreement upon a five 
point Likert scale (where 5 = strongly agree, 4 = agree, 3 
= undecided, 2 = disagree and 1 = strongly disagree). 
Each question number is subsequently referred to as S1-
S13. The sample size is denoted by (n) and is derived 
using the Yaro Yamen‟s formular    
 n =      __N_____                             
           1+N (e)
2 
 Where n = sample size 
            N= Population 
            e =margin for error terms (5%) 
n =____216________ 
        1+ (216) (0.05)
2
 
 
n =____216________ 
       1+ (216) (0.0025) 
 
n =_216____ 
 1+0.54 
 
n =_216___ 
       1.5 4       
n =140 
Factors used as explanatory variables for the 
determination of dividend payout ratio and firm value are 
outlined and explained as follows. 
Dependent variable; 
1.  Dividend per share (DPS) is given by dividends 
divided by the total earnings. It is the percentage of 
earnings that the firm pays out as cash dividend.    
Independent variables;  
1. Earnings per share (EPS) Is the value of earning 
divided by total number of shares. It is based on profit 
after taxation and the number of issued and fully paid 
ordinary shares as at the end of each financial year. 
2.  Market price per share (MPS) is simply the closing 
price of any given stock as reported by the exchange 
3.1 Decision rule 
For analyzing primary data, a choice of 5% level of 
significant and 95% level of confidence will be made. For 
analyzing secondary data, it is interpreted as the 
proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that 
is predictable from the independent variable. Its decision 
rule is +1 or -1. 
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Dividend policy is concerned with the allocation of 
earnings between dividend and retained earnings. 
Dividend policy has implication on the market value of 
the firm‟s equity. Both existing and prospective stock 
holders consider this policy (dividend policy) very 
critically before they invest in the shares of a company. 
Earnings capacity of firms is also a determining factor to 
sustain an investor‟s confidence on firms. I.e. a stock 
dividend is an opportunity claimed or given by a firm to 
recapitalize and this does not affect the proportionate 
ownership of the shareholders because there are more 
shares out-standing, it reduces earnings per share and 
market price per share (Egungwu, 2003). Dividend per 
share will be used as a proxy for measuring shareholders 
wealth and serves as the dependent variable for this work, 
while earnings per share and market price per share will 
be used as a proxy for measuring dividend policy and 
serves as the independent variables. Multiple regressions 
is therefore, adequate for this research work. 
3.2 Validity and reliability of data instrument 
The Cronbach‟s alpha was used to test the reliability of 
questionnaire and it gave a value of 0.839. this suggests 
that the item have relatively high internal consistency. 
3.3 Case processing summary 
                                    Table 1 
 N % 
Case         Valid 
                 Excluded      
                 Total 
171 
0 
171 
100 
.0 
100 
     Source: (author‟s computation)  
3.4 Reliability Statistics 
Table 2 
Cronbach‟s alpha No of items 
.839 12 
     Source: (author‟s computation) 
3.5 Modelspecification 
MPS = (EPS, DPS) -------------------------------- 1 
MPS!t = ao!t +b1+ EPS!t, b2+DPS!t,+ εr!t --------- 2  
MPS!t = ao!t +b1EPS!t *DPS!t + εr!t ---------------3 
 
MPS = (EPS, DPS) -------------------------------- 1 
MPS!t = ao!t +b1+ EPS!t, b2+DPS!t,+ εr!t ----------------2 
MPS!t = ao!t +b1EPS!t *DPS!t  + εr!t -----------------------3 
Where; 
MPS!t: Market price per share ί in year t. 
 EPS!t: Earnings per share ί in year t: 
 DPS!t: Dividend per share ί in year t. 
β0, β1, β2, = coefficients 
εi = error terms. 
The model is expected to be β0 > 0; β1 >0, β2> 0. Simple 
regression technique, ordinary least square (OLS) was 
used for data estimation and analysis. In the course of 
analysis, correlation coefficient analysis, pooled 
regression analysis and other diagnostic test were 
conducted. These were done with the aid of E-View 7 
software. 
3.6 Test of Primary Data 
Table 3 
YEAR FRV AGC DVP IFA 
50 65 26 35 28 
100 48 20 25 20 
150 72 33 40 32 
200 84 38 50 40 
250 90 40 50 40 
300 91 42 50 40 
350 234 160 201 159 
Figure 1 
                
  
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variable: FRV 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 11/04/16   Time: 18:26 
Sample: 2000 2006 
                                               Table 4       
  Included observations: 7   
          
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     
AGC 0.977640 0.677224 1.443599 0.2446 
DVP 32.61981 7.383513 4.417925 0.0215 
IFA -39.77522 9.446195 -4.210714 0.0245 
C 9.257143 4.502554 2.055976 0.1320 
     
     
0
100
200
300
400
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
YEAR
FRV
AGC
DVP
IFA
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R-squared 0.999809 Mean dependent var 121.1429 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999619 S.D. dependent var 123.0345 
S.E. of regression 2.401820 Akaike info criterion 4.885890 
Sum squared resid 17.30621 Schwarz criterion 4.854981 
Log likelihood -13.10061 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.503866 
F-statistic 5247.108 Durbin-Watson stat 1.669173 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
     
     
 
 
    
 
R
2
= 0.42748. this shows 
that 43% of the total 
variations in  LEV are 
explained by the 
independent variable OPR. 
since the Although Durbin 
Watson is low and shows a 
low correlation between 
leverage and operational 
risk. We accept H2 which 
states that there is positive 
relationship between 
leverage and litigation risk 
disclosure. 
 
    
R
2
= 0.999809. This shows that 99% of the total variations 
in FRV is explained by the independent variables AGC, 
DVP and IFA. The Durbin Watson is high almost at 2 and 
shows a perfect correlation and a positive effect of  
information content of dividend and firm value, agency 
cost and firm value, dividend policies and firm value. We 
accept H1, H2, &H3  which states that there is information 
content of dividends determines dividend payout by firms, 
agency cost between shareholders and management 
affects the dividend payment pattern of firms and there is 
an effect of various dividend policies on shareholders 
wealth 
3.7 Test of Secondary data 
YEAR MPS DPS EPS 
1995 72.0032 4.9843 29.0344 
1996 73.3422 5.3297 43.211 
1997 89.2018 6.7456 123.221 
1998 95.9873 7.3201 23.674 
1999 95.4321 7.1002 45218 
2000 97.0011 7.5783 156002 
2001 98.7321 7.8235 13.8344 
2002 9867321 78456 78.364 
2003 100.2011 8.2118 46.732 
2004 98.2036 8.0021 3745110 
2005 110.041 8.3901 1249.4 
2006 123.674 9.2364 104.456 
2007 125.5054 9.9018 113.8202 
2008 13.27525 3.671203 9.598825 
2009 20577412 2952466 23464697 
2010 73.56 78.74548 -5.29797 
2011 117.3005 -77.7132 194.1557 
2012 21344198 21087125 254716 
2013 72.57277 15.3941 56.7845 
2014 214.2989 73.99791 139.7844 
2015 28.0125 19.9034 7.8508 
Table 5 
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Figure 2 
Dependent Variable: MPS   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 12/15/16   Time: 17:07   
Sample: 1995 2015   
Included observations: 21   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
          
DPS -2.03E-07 6.37E-07 -0.318284 0.7541 
EPS 5.60E-07 7.04E-07 0.796398 0.4368 
SER01 2.88E-07 5.34E-07 0.538466 0.5972 
C 2004.477 1.499712 1336.575 0.0000 
     
     
R-squared 0.096565 Mean dependent var 2005.000 
Adjusted R-squared -0.062865 S.D. dependent var 6.204837 
S.E. of regression 6.396898 Akaike info criterion 6.719147 
Sum squared resid 695.6453 Schwarz criterion 6.918104 
Log likelihood -66.55104 Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.762326 
F-statistic 0.605687 Durbin-Watson stat 0.259003 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.620281    
     
     
Table 6 
R
2
= 0.096565. This shows that 100% of the total 
variations in MPS is explained by the independent 
variables DPS and EPS. The Durbin Watson is very high 
at 0.259 and shows a perfect correlation between MPS, 
DPS and EPS. We accept H1, H2, &H3  which states that 
there is information content of dividends determines 
dividend payout by firms, agency cost between 
shareholders and management affects the dividend 
payment pattern of firms and there is an effect of various 
dividend policies on shareholders wealth 
4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
,CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATION 
This chapter dealt with analysing responses based on 
respondent‟s views on dividend payments and the effect 
on firm value. The majority of respondents agreed with 
the following dividend policy statements: 
1. a dividend policy that maintains steady or modestly 
growing dividend payments 
2. a dividend policy that adjusts dividend payments 
towards a target payout ratio 
3. The above policy statements are a consequence of the 
majority of respondents agreeing to the following 
statements on dividend relevant theory: 
4. importance of dividend policy on firm value 
5. the bird-in-the-hand theory of dividend payments 
6. dividend payments prevent surplus cash flows from 
being used in unprofitable investments 
7. dividend payments are better signals of confidential 
information  
8. a formal dividend policy gives the assurance of 
predictable dividend payments 
9. a common policy can be used by all firms to 
determine firm value 
10. shareholders are indifferent to receiving dividends as 
compared to share increase 
There is a very high correlation between dividend policies 
and firm value at 0.99 which is an almost perfect 
correlation (close to 0.1). and 0.1 which shows a perfect 
correlation. This shows that dividend policies have an 
overwhelming significant effect on firm value of public 
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limited companies in Nigeria. The results further 
corroborate the works of Oyejide (1976), Izedonmi and 
Eriki (1996) and Adelegan (2003). This study adds to the 
body of literature on corporate dividend policy in Nigeria. 
The results of the study underscore the need for Board of 
Directors (BODs) to maintain a steady increase in 
earnings, cash flow and dividend payment.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Please tick (   ) the appropriate answer to each question or otherwise fill in the blank space where necessary. 
5=Strongly Agree 
4=Agree 
3=Undecided  
2=Disagree 
1=Strongly Disagree 
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           SA A         U          DA       SD             
1.  Do you think that a dividend policy is important 
             because of the effect it has on the company‟s 
             share price and  firm value? 
 
2. Does your company pay dividend only when 
positive investments project have been financed? 
 
3. Do you think that shareholders prefer the  
bird-in-the-hand theory of dividend payouts, that is, 
 receiving dividend payout now not bothering what 
 future dividends will be? 
 
4. Do you think that dividend payout provide signals 
to prospective investors?  
 
5. An increase in a dividend payout is usually accompanied  
by an increase in the share price? 
 
6. A decrease or omission of a dividend payout is usually  
accompanied by a decrease in the share price? 
 
7. Do you think that a common dividend policy could be 
 used by all companies 
 
8. Do you think that dividend payouts remove excess cash  
flow from being invested in negative investment projects 
that will only reduce firm value? 
 
9. Do you think that a firm should strive to maintain  
uninterrupted or a steady dividend payment? 
 
10. Do you think that dividend policies have no effect 
       on firm value? 
 
11. Do you think that a firm should have a target payout ratio 
And always adjust its dividend payment towards the 
target? 
 
12. Do you think that the market uses dividend  
announcements as information for assessing firm values? 
 
 
